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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/735,621	12/16/2003	Akira Shimizu	829-619	2644	
23117	7590 07/07/2006		EXAMINER		
	VANDERHYE, PC	ARANCIBIA, MAUREEN GRAMAGLIA			
	GLEBE ROAD, 11TH I N, VA 22203	FLOOR	ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
71112111010	., , , , ,		1763		
			DATE MAILED: 07/07/2006		

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)
10/735,621	SHIMIZU ET AL.
Examiner	Art Unit
Maureen G. Arancibia	1763

	Wadreen G. Alancibia	1,700				
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress			
THE REPLY FILED <u>20 June 2006</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.						
 The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the folloplaces the application in condition for allowance; (2) a N (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in comp following time periods: 	n the same day as filing a Notice of owing replies: (1) an amendment, a otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	of Appeal. To avoid ab offidavit, or other evide compliance with 37 C	ence, which CFR 41.31; or			
a) The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date of	f the final rejection.					
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Adverse, will the statutory period for reply expire later the	an SIX MONTHS from the mailing date o	f the final rejection.				
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b) MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).					
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension a CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened stabove, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three month earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	and the corresponding amount of the fee. atutory period for reply originally set in the	The appropriate extension final Office action; or (2)	n fee under 37 as set forth in (b)			
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in com of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any ending a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must	extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of	of the appeal.			
AMENDMENTS 3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection,	but prior to the date of filing a brie	of will not be entered i	necalise			
(a) They raise new issues that would require further co			Jecause			
(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo		,,,				
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or	tter form for appeal by materially r	educing or simplifying	the issues for			
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a	corresponding number of finally re	ejected claims.				
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a))						
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.	121. See attached Notice of Non-C	ompliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).			
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):						
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).						
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is proof the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		vill be entered and an	explanation of			
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: <u>4-6,15-17 and 28</u> .						
Claim(s) objected to: 4-0, 10-17 and 20. Claim(s) rejected: 1-3,7-14,18-22 and 27. Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:						
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE						
8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, because applicant failed to provide a showing of good an and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).	out before or on the date of filing a land sufficient reasons why the affidate	Notice of Appeal will <u>ravit or other evidence</u>	ot be entered is necessary			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessal	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appe	eal and/or appellant fa	ils to provide a			
10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	on of the status of the claims after	entry is below or attac	ched.			
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered b See Continuation Sheet.	ut does NOT place the application	in condition for allowa	ince because:			
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper No(s). 06/06						
13. Other:		pt				
Maureen Hanc. L		PARVIZ HASSAN	ZADEH			
www.	SUF	PERVISORY PATEN				

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office PTOL-303 (Rev. 7-05) Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant's arguments filed 20 June 2006 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

In response to applicant's argument that the disclosed substrate holder in the instant application permits suppression or reduction of unnecessary discharge occurring in a gap between the substrate holder and an electrode, as wall as suppression or reduction of an uneven discharge on a substrate, the fact that applicant has recognized another advantage which would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the differences would otherwise be obvious. See Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985).

In regards to Applicant's argument against the rejection of Claim 1 as being anticipated by Bubenzer et al., the Examiner maintains that element 19 of Bubenzer et al. may be considered a substrate holder, as broadly recited in the claim, since it supports (holds) a substrate layer 23 to be processed. Conductive member 26 is electrically connected to electrode 5 and the substrate holder 19, as required by the claim. (Bubenzer et al., Abstract)

Applicant's arguments that element 19 can not be considered to be a substrate holder, and that element 23 can not be considered to be a substrate, are not convincing. The Examiner agrees that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must also be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359, 49 USPQ2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This is because Applicant always has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969). In the instant case, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a substrate holder, broadly recited, may be a component that holds an element to be processed. In the case of Bubenzer et al., the element 19 holds another element 23 to be processed, and thus may broadly be considered a substrate holder.

Moreover, it is noted that the instant claims are apparatus claims, not process claims. The prior art structure must be capable of performing the intended use recited in the claims. In the instant case, even if element 23 of Bubenzer et al. were not considered to be a substrate, element 19 would still be structurally capable of holding a substrate. Likewise, even if Bubenzer et al. were not considered to expressly teach the deposition of additional thin films on element 23, the apparatus taught by Bubenzer et al. would still be structurally capable of depositing additional thin films, whether on element 23 or another substrate. That Bubenzer et al. may call the various elements by certain terms does not prevent those elements from meeting the structural limitations recited in the claims.

In other words, element 19 of Bubenzer et al. meets the structural limitations of the substrate holder as recited in the claims. A recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it meets the claim.

In regards to Applicant's argument against the rejection of Claims 12 and 27, the Examiner recognizes that Bubenzer et al. fails to expressly teach certain features recited in Claims 12 and 27. Therefore, Claims 12 and 27 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 on the grounds that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to construct conductive member 26 of a plurality of juxtaposed, closely spaced conductive strips, in order to allow damaged or overly coated (Bubenzer et al., Abstract) sections to be replaced without necessitating replacement of the entire conductive piece.

The Examiner notes that obviousness can be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, the Examiner asserts that the motivation to modify the teachings of Bubenzer et al. would have been found in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, as described above.

In response to Applicant's argument that the Examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

The Examiner notes that an official translation of Bubenzer et al. has been ordered, and will be provided with any subsequent office action.